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Uncertain Rights against Defense 
Bas van der Vossen 
 
Suppose someone pulls out a gun and takes aim at you with a crazed look in their 
eyes. Having watched many Westerns, you quickly draw your own gun and kill the 
person in self-defense. Were you justified in doing so? 
 It seems we need to know more of the facts to answer this question. If you 
were on a movie set, and you new the person aiming at you was an actor, then you 
were not justified in killing him. If you knew he was a dangerous murderer, and the 
only way to defend yourself was to shoot this person, then you would be justified. 
But what should we think if you were not sure about what was going on? What if the 
person might be an actor, but you have also been warned about a dangerous killer 
who is on the loose? Would you be justified in killing this person? This is the issue I 
want to address. 
 More precisely, I want to address the question of liability to defensive force 
under uncertainty.1 The conditions of X’s liability, as I understand it, are the 
conditions under which X forfeits certain rights, in this case rights against defensive 
force. I will defend what can be broadly labeled an evidence-sensitive, rights-based 
view about liability. On such a view, people become liable to defensive force when 
and because others have, subject to certain conditions, compelling evidence that 
they threaten the rights of others, in some way to be specified. 
 
1. The question 
Consider again the person drawing a gun on you. I said that one of the things we 
needed to know was whether this person is an actor or murderer. The reason is 
obvious. A key part of the justification of defensive force is whether the target of 
such force has a right that we not use it. People can lack this right because they 
forfeited it. The conditions under which a person forfeits rights against defensive 
                                                        
1 The arguments below deal with uncertainty about the situations in which we find 
ourselves, not uncertainty about what is the correct moral theory. 
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force are the conditions under which they are liable to the use of such force. If 
someone is about to murder you, he might thereby forfeit his rights against, and 
thus become liable to, your defensive force. Different theories offer different 
explanations for why the murderer might be liable. Perhaps liability tracks 
culpability, moral responsibility for an unjust threat, or something else. (More on 
this below.)2 
  However, in order for us to be morally justified in treating the person 
drawing the gun as liable to our defensive force, must we know that he is a 
murderer? It is attractive to say yes, since doing so identifies as liable all and only 
actual murderers (and relevantly similar people). Indeed, this is the answer most 
philosophical theories of liability propose in one way or another. Let us call such 
theories of liability objectivist theories. On an objectivist view, the conditions of 
liability refer to the objective facts about the purportedly liable person(s), the 
defender(s), or the relation in which they stand. 
 Cases of uncertainty are problematic, however. When the thing we have good 
reason to believe to be the case may or may not in fact be the case, questions of 
liability become very difficult to handle in objectivist ways. If you were told by a 
very reliable source that a dangerous killer was on the loose, and someone pulls a 
gun at you, you may have good reason to believe you are in mortal danger, even if 
the person turns out to be only an actor. If you use defensive force in such a 
situation, would you violate the person’s rights? This is our question. 
 There are four possible scenarios here. First, the person drawing a gun might 
actually be a killer, as indeed your evidence suggests he is. Second, the person might 
be an actor, and again your evidence might fit the facts. Third, the person might be 
an actor, while your evidence is that he is actually a killer. And fourth, he might 
actually be a killer, although your evidence points to him being an actor. 
                                                        
2 Throughout, I will assume that the force used is proportionate. Thus, the liability we 
discuss is only liability to proportionate defensive force. I set aside other issues, such as 
whether the force is necessary, or what it exactly entails.  
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 The first two cases are fairly straightforward. The killer is, while the actor is 
not, liable to defensive force. Thus, other things equal, you were justified in shooting 
the killer and not the actor.3 But what about the third and fourth cases? On an 
objectivist view of liability, these cases, too, seem straightforward. In the third case, 
the person (being just an actor) is not liable to defensive force, even though you had 
good evidence he was a killer. If you were to shoot the actor, you would violate his 
rights. You would do something morally wrong, even if your action were 
understandable. In the standard language, you violated his rights, and thus acted 
wrongly, but may be excused for doing so.4 
 The inverse applies to the fourth case. You would not act wrongly if you 
shoot the person because he was, in fact, a killer. This is so even though your 
evidence suggested he was innocent. Using objectivist language, shooting the killer 
would have been terribly irresponsible, and you would be culpable for choosing to 
do so. But, other things equal, you did nothing that is morally wrong. After all, the 
killer, being in fact a killer, was liable to defensive force. 
 I no longer believe that the objectivist way of dealing with these cases is 
satisfactory. And since in real life we are always less than certain about the facts, I 
no longer believe that the objectivist way of dealing with defensive liability in 
general is satisfactory. We must rely on imperfect information about other people’s 
plans, the consequences of their actions and ours, and so on. Cases in which we are 
not sure in which of these scenarios we find ourselves pose the central question 
about the justifiability of defensive force. 
 The remainder of this paper consists of three parts. First, drawing on recent 
work by Michael Zimmerman, I will argue that objectivist approaches to liability fail 
and offer a basic outline of what, as far as I can tell, is the best response to this 
                                                        
3 Throughout, when discussing moral permissibility, “ought”, and other similar terms, I will 
insert the phrase “other things equal” to indicate that I am talking about these terms to the 
extent that they track the presence or absence of rights.  
4 See e.g. Heidi Hurd, Moral Combat, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 7.  
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problem.5 Second, I will discuss two ways in which others have tried to deal with 
problems of uncertainty and show why these fail. This reinforces the arguments 
from the first part. In the third part, I begin to fill out the outline of the first part 
with a Lockean rights-based account of liability and respond to some objections. 
 
2. Attack under uncertainty 
Consider the following, well-known example. 
MISTAKEN ATTACKER: Vince’s car breaks down and he knocks on Annie’s door 
for help. When Annie answers the door and sees Vince, she believes he is 
about to attack her. Annie has very good evidence for this because she 
received a warning by the police that a villainous murderer, whose 
description Vince fits perfectly, has escaped a nearby prison. Unfortunately, 
the evidence is wrong. Vince, by tragic coincidence, is the murderer’s twin 
                                                        
5 See Michael Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty, (Cambridge University Press, 2008) and 
Ignorance and Moral Obligation, (Oxford University Press, 2014). Zimmerman discusses 
self-defense in Living with Uncertainty, pp. 108ff. There are two differences between 
Zimmerman’s discussion and my own. First, Zimmerman offers no substantive theory of 
liability, but uses the case of self-defense to test his broader view. The final, rights-based 
part of the argument below thus serves to complement his discussion. Second, I disagree 
with Zimmerman on two counts. I find his arguments against objectivist theories of liability 
unsatisfactory because he claims that such theories cannot explain why aggressors become 
liable before the actual attack has occurred. This seems false. Moreover, Zimmerman says 
that if A threatens V, and A knows this, but V does not know this, then A nevertheless 
becomes liable to V’s defensive force. (See Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty, pp. 108-10.) 
My account does not support this conclusion, as, it seems to me, is the view’s natural 
implication. Zimmerman claims (p. 109) that V would still be wrong to attack A, but for 
some other reason than A’s rights. This strikes me as ad hoc. What is wrong about V’s attack 
if not how it treats A?). 
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brother. Upon seeing Vince, and acting on her evidence, Annie attacks Vince 
in (mistaken) self-defense.6 
 The objectivist holds that since Vince was not actually threatening Annie in 
any significant way, Vince was not liable to Annie’s defensive force. And so, other 
things equal, that Annie ought not to attack Vince. Perhaps Annie can be excused if 
she nonetheless attacks Vince because her evidence conspired against her, but she 
did wrong Vince. She violated his rights. We can see this, the objectivist might push 
on, because were Annie to find out that Vince was innocent, she too would recognize 
that she ought to respect Vince’s objectivist rights. 
 The problem with this way of treating MISTAKEN ATTACKER is what it implies 
about how conscientious moral agents should act. In general, it is not true that what 
we ought to do is what the objectivist singles out. Consider another well-known type 
of case (which traces back at least to Frank Jackson, and is discussed at length by 
Zimmerman). 
UNCERTAIN RESCUE: Annie has evidence that Vince is about to detonate a 
bomb, which will kill at least a hundred innocent people. There are three 
ways in which she might try to stop him. Option A is to kill Vince. Option B is 
to kill Vince and five of the innocents. And option C is to kill Vince and ninety-
five of the innocents. Unfortunately, Annie’s evidence is incomplete. It tells 
her only (i) how to take option B, (ii) that the remaining two options are A 
and C, but not which is which, and (iii) that there is no time to wait and 
collect more evidence. 
If Annie is to act on objectivist grounds, then she ought to choose option A. The 
objectivist, again, might say that Annie should be excused for not doing this, given 
her evidence, but A remains the right thing to do. After all, as far as the facts go, 
                                                        
6 The example is a variation on a case presented by Jeff McMahan, “The Basis of Moral 
Liability To Defensive Killing,” Philosophical Issues 15 (2005): 386-405, p. 387. Jonathan 
Quong, “Liability to Defensive Harm”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012): 45-77 also 
discusses a variation of this example (p. 53). 
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options B and C involve killing innocent (non-liable) people. If what we ought to do 
is, other things equal, a function of the objectivist facts, then Annie ought to do A. 
 But this is plainly unacceptable. The only way Annie can take option A is to 
take a 50/50 gamble between A and C in UNCERTAIN RESCUE. And that is something 
she clearly ought not to do. Annie cannot permissibly take the chance of killing 
ninety-five non-liable people, given her other options. To take that gamble would be 
horribly irresponsible, even though it is the only way for Annie to do what is 
demanded in objectivist terms. 
 Three things are worth noting here. First, the judgment above remains true 
even if Annie took the gamble and things worked out favorably – by option A 
materializing. For Annie would still not have done what she ought to have done in 
light of the (non-)liability of the people involved. 
 Second, the judgment also remains true if we look at things from the other 
side. If Annie chooses B, the five innocent people who died as a result surely have 
reason to regret what Annie did. But it is implausible to say they could legitimately 
demand that she do something else. Surely they, too, will recognize that, in light of 
her evidence, Annie did what she ought to have done. The same does not hold if 
Annie takes the gamble. The people who would have definitely been saved had she 
taken option B do have standing to insist that she act otherwise. After all, Annie put 
their lives in unnecessary peril. 
 Third, the normal objectivist responses here do not work. It is clearly 
mistaken to say that Annie ought to choose option A. And it is clearly mistaken to 
say that, were Annie to find out afterwards that option A would have killed Vince 
alone, she would recognize that she should have taken option A. It remains wrong 
for her to have chosen A. Finally, it will not do to say that Annie ought to do B 
because she can be excused given her evidence. Excuses are not among the 
appropriate reasons or input for the question of what to do. What we need are 
justifications. If Annie can avoid doing something that she ought not to do, then she 
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ought quite simply to avoid it. And this is true even if she would have an excuse for 
doing it anyway.7 
 The upshot, then, is that Annie ought to choose B in UNCERTAIN RESCUE. But 
she knows that B is not what is recommend by objectivist theories of what she ought 
to do. After all, she knows that B means killing five non-liable people who she could 
save. It is false, therefore, that we generally ought to do what objectivist theories 
require. 
 What underlies this, I believe, is that when we take up the perspective of the 
moral agents as such we are asking, in a first-personal manner, what she, morally 
speaking, ought to do. To say we take up this question in a first-personal manner is 
simply to say that we want to know what we ought to do in situations like this, 
acting in a morally conscientious way. We want to know how we should act in order 
to avoid violating other people’s rights, to comply with our duties, and so on. 
 This may sound like platitude. And in a sense it is. Ethics is a practical 
discipline; what else could it be for? But if it is platitude, UNCERTAIN RESCUE shows 
that objectivist approaches cannot live up to it. For it is simply false to say these 
(platitudinous) things about the claim that it is wrong for Annie, given her choice-
situation, to choose B. No morally conscientious person would recognize that as the 
correct verdict. 
 Instead, what Annie ought to do is what is what we might call her best bet, in 
light of the evidence. This notion of a best bet is different from doing what is the 
best thing in objectivist terms, but rather refers to what is the right thing to do in 
terms of the evidence available.8 Sometimes it is clear what our best bet consists in. 
In UNCERTAIN RESCUE, light of the evidence available to Annie, and given the 
appropriate weighing of the liable and non-liable lives involved, Annie’s best is 
option B, even though it will involve avoidably killing five non-liable people. 
                                                        
7 Compare Rodin’s discussion about justifications and excuses in David Rodin, War and Self-
Defense, (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 30–31. 
8 I draw the notion of a “best bet” from Zimmerman. For more detailed discussion, see 
Living with Uncertainty and Ignorance and Moral Obligation, throughout. 
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 But if this is right way to think about UNCERTAIN RESCUE, then it is also the 
right way to think about MISTAKEN ATTACKER. And there, Annie’s evidence was that 
she was dealing with a villainous murderer. In light of this, and given an appropriate 
weighing of the issues concerning liability involved, it again seems that Annie’s best 
is that she is not prohibited from defending herself against Vince. And if that was 
sufficient in UNCERTAIN RESCUE to conclude that Annie ought to choose B, then it is 
also sufficient in MISTAKEN ATTACKER to conclude that Annie can permissibly attack 
Vince. 
 We can now see the trouble for objectivist theories of liability. The 
conclusion that Annie is permitted to attack Vince in self-defense in MISTAKEN 
ATTACKER is precisely contrary to the verdict of objectivist theories. For if it is false 
that Annie ought not to attack Vince, then it is likely also false that doing so would 
wrong Vince. After all, it is difficult to see how, other things being equal, Annie 
would wrong Vince without doing something that she ought not to do. But if Annie 
does not wrong Vince, then she will also likely not violate a duty owed to Vince. 
After all, it is difficult to see how, other things equal, Annie might violate a duty 
owed to Vince without thereby wronging him. And if Annie does not violate a duty 
she owes Vince, then she likely also does not violate Vince’s rights. After all, it is 
difficult to see how, other things equal, Annie might violate Vince’s rights without 
violating a duty she owes him. Vince, in other words, is liable to Annie’s use of force 
in MISTAKEN ATTACKER. The objectivist theory of liability is wrong.9 
 The price is denying this, again, is the unacceptable verdict in UNCERTAIN 
RESCUE that Annie ought to choose option A. So we can conclude that whether 
Annie’s actions are wrong, or wrong Vince, or violate his rights, does not depend on 
objectivist facts about Vince, his actions, and related issues, but on Annie’s evidence 
concerning Vince, his actions, and related issues. In short, Vince’s liability to Annie’s 
defensive force depends on whether it is Annie’s best bet in light of the evidence 
that Vince is liable. 
                                                        
9 Throughout I assume that it is not Annie’s fault that the evidence is faulty 
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 Two things are worth noting about this notion of a best bet. First, the 
observation that objectivist theories should be replaced with theories organized 
around the idea of an evidence-based best bet is part of a more general thesis about 
what we ought to do morally. As such, the implications for the question of liability 
will be sensitive to the more general truth about what will count as a best bet. An 
attempt at providing a full account of this general moral truth would take us well 
beyond the confines of this article. All that can be done here is offer an account of 
how what would go into the idea of a best bet insofar as questions of liability are 
concerned. Section 4 below outlines such an account. 
 Second, the idea is not plausibly understood in terms of maximizing expected 
moral value, such that what we ought to do is whatever option offers the highest 
product of moral value and its probability of coming about. Suppose, for example, 
that Annie knows that there is a 90% chance that Vince is liable to the use of lethal 
defensive force. And suppose that the expected moral value of this is sufficient for 
Annie to be (other things equal) justified in killing Vince. If we label the net value of 
saving the innocents as V, then it follows that the expected value of Annie’s killing 
Vince is 0.9*V. But compare this to a group of a hundred people, ninety of whom 
Annie knows with certainty are about to kill a five innocent people, and thus liable, 
while the remaining ten are innocent, and thus non-liable. Clearly, Annie would not 
be (other things equal) justified in killing one person at random from this group. But 
the expected value is the same as above: 0.9*V. So expected value calculations 
cannot capture the intuitive notion of the morally best bet.10 
 
3. Against hybrid theories 
The argument above shows that Vince’s liability is sensitive to Annie’s evidence. The 
combination of (a) the observation Annie did not do something she ought not to do 
                                                        
10 Similarly, X’s best bet about Y’s liability cannot be simply understood as X being justified 
in believing that Y is liable. While the account proposed below refers to some of X’s justified 




by using force against Vince, and (b) the claim that if Vince were not liable, then 
(other things equal) Annie would have done something wrong by attacking him, 
implies that (c) Vince was (other things equal) liable to Annie’s defensive force in 
MISTAKEN ATTACKER. 
 The two key claims in this argument can be summarized as follows. The first 
is may be called the first-personal nature of moral requirements, “oughts”, duties, 
and so on. This claim holds, quite simply, that the moral verdict of what Annie ought 
to do in situations like the cases above is what we would want her to do in those 
cases. We can ask whether a theory of liability delivers acceptable first-personal 
moral judgments by asking whether a well-informed and morally conscientious 
person would recognize the thing Annie is permitted or required to do as (other 
things equal) indeed the right thing to do. 
 This claim is very plausible. We are asking when people are morally 
permitted to use defensive force, insofar as other people’s rights are concerned. And 
to be permitted to use defensive force in this sense, it has to be true that the morally 
conscientious person would accept that using defensive force was indeed the right 
or morally acceptable thing to do. The question we are asking is what the moral 
agent should do.11 
 The second claim concerns the connection between Vince’s rights and what 
Annie is (other things equal) morally required to do. I take it that all theories of 
liability to defensive force accept something like the claim that if Annie uses 
defensive force against Vince, and Vince is not liable to such defensive force, then 
(other things being equal) Annie thereby wrongs Vince, and is therefore doing 
something that (other things equal) she morally ought not to do. 
                                                        
11 For related points, see Helen Frowe, “A Practical Account of Self-Defence”, Law and 
Philosophy 29 (2010): 245-72, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense”, Law and 
Philosophy 24 (2005): 711–749, and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Culpable Aggression: The 




 This claim, too, is very plausible. It expresses the correlativity of claim-rights 
and duties, a centerpiece of moral and legal philosophy. Indeed, it is central to the 
very motivation to think about liability. A primary reason we care about questions 
about liability is that people’s rights imply duties and thus have important 
implications for what we ought to do. The fact that we normally have rights against 
force is central to the question of when defensive force is morally permissible. 
 The conjunction of these claims implies that Vince’s rights are sensitive to 
Annie’s evidence. This, of course, is likely to cause (considerable) discomfort. In this 
section I consider two theories that propose hybrid ways of dealing with the 
problem of uncertainty, combining objectivist and evidence-based considerations in 
order to avoid the discomfort. Unfortunately, these theories fail as neither can 
adequately incorporate both of the plausible claims above. 
 First, Jonathan Quong argues that people like Vince become liable to 
defensive harm when they do something that results in a threat of harm to people 
like Annie, provided she has a right against such harms and subject to constraints 
about the evidence available to her. Quong distinguishes between fact-relative and 
evidence-relative permissibility. Acts are permissible in the fact-relative sense when 
they are, in fact, permissible. Fact-relative permissibility in no way depends on one’s 
evidence or epistemic situation, but only on how things objectively are. Evidence-
relative permissibility refers to an agent’s evidence about whether an act is, in fact, 
morally permissible. When we act under uncertainty, we may not know what would 
be the objectively right thing to do. 
 Quong proposes the following hybrid theory of liability: 
A person is liable to defensive harm for choosing to do X when that choice 
results in a threat of harm to innocent people if and only if: (a) choosing X 
meets the minimum conditions of moral responsibility, and (b) the evidence-
relative permissibility of choosing X depends either on the assumption that 
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those who are harmed (or might foreseeably be harmed) by choosing X are 
liable to the harm, or else on false moral beliefs.12 
The main idea is that we become liable for choices that impose threats on others 
when those choices do not treat them as their moral status demands. 
 There is, however, an important instability in this theory, at least insofar as it 
is meant to deal with the problem of uncertainty. Quong’s account suggests that 
Annie is liable to Vince’s counter-defense in MISTAKEN ATTACKER (a conclusion I 
share, more on this below). However, the need to recognize the importance of 
evidence militates against the motivation for this conclusion. Quong says that Annie 
becomes liable because, even though she was permitted to attack Vince in the 
evidence-relative sense, she was not permitted in the fact-relative sense. And people 
become liable if they choose to do something that results in a threat that is, in fact, 
unjustified. We should hold Annie to be liable on fact-relative grounds, Quong 
writes, because she took a risk when she acted, the risk that she was treating Vince 
in a way that would be justified only if he lacked a right against her use of force. This 
makes it fair to impose the burden of the mistake on Annie.13 
 But this is unacceptable. Annie acted in accordance with her best bet in light 
of the evidence (and it is not her fault that the evidence is faulty). This means, we 
saw, that it is untenable to say that she acted wrongly. Again, what else would we 
want her to do? Moreover, she did not contribute more to the tragic situation than 
Vince did. Of course she made a decision that risked creating the tragic situation, but 
so did Vince when he decided to knock on her door (especially given that he has a 
murderous twin). But if Annie is neither at fault nor the main contributor to the 
problem, there is simply no way in which it is fair for her to bear the full burden of 
                                                        
12 See Quong, “Liability to Defensive Harm”, pp. 67-8. Quong introduces the evidence-
relative qualification to deal with certain cases of risk-imposition. Since I do not see an 
important difference between the proposal below and that part of his account, I leave this 
issue aside. In what follows, I consider the theory’s suitability for dealing with problems of 
uncertainty, which may not have been Quong’s purpose. 
13 Quong, “Liability for Defensive Harm”, pp. 69ff. 
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the situation. And so we cannot reasonably hold it against her that she attacked 
Vince in MISTAKEN ATTACKER. 
 The central motivation for this theory thus does not take fully seriously what 
I called the first-personal side of the question. The intuition that it is no fairer for 
Annie to bear the burdens of the tragic circumstances of MISTAKEN ATTACKER than 
Vince bears this out. Once we recognize that Annie’s evidence matters for what she 
ought to do, and objectivist reasoning is to be rejected, we cannot then continue to 
appeal to objectivist notions of fairness. We need to recognize how this point affects 
other parts of the story about liability as well. But when the objectivist notion of 
fairness is replaced by an evidence-sensitive notion, we have effectively replaced 
Quong’s hybrid theory with a thoroughly evidence-sensitive one. 
 A second way of dealing with uncertainty is suggested by Helen Frowe. Like 
me, Frowe believes that “it is a mistake to build our accounts of permissible defence 
around knowledge that [people] cannot have”.14 Nevertheless, Frowe resists the 
thought that liability is sensitive to the evidence of defenders. Instead, she wants to 
“distinguish between the justness of inflicting a harm, and justness of the harm 
itself.”15 This leads to a hybrid theory in which (a) the permissibility of Annie’s 
defensive force depends on the evidence available to her,16 but (b) Vince’s liability 
to this force depends on the facts as they objectively are.17 Consider again MISTAKEN 
ATTACKER. For Frowe, it was morally permissible for Annie to harm Vince in self-
                                                        
14 Frowe, “A Practical Account of Self-Defence”, p. 250. She calls this the “myth of ‘full and 
accurate’ knowledge”. 
15 Frowe, “A Practical Account of Self-Defence”, p. 260 
16 More precisely: [I]f defensive force is ever permissible, its use must be justified on the 
grounds of Victim’s reasonable belief that (a) if he does not kill this person, then they will 
kill him, and (b) that he is innocent.” Frowe, “A Practical Account of Self-Defence”, p. 252 
17 “[W]hether or not Victim is justified in inflicting harm is not the same question as 
whether his target is liable to bear that harm. What renders a person liable to bear harm are 
objective facts about culpability.” Frowe, “A Practical Account of Self-Defence”, pp. 252-3 
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defense because of her epistemic situation. But Vince was nevertheless not liable to 
her use of force because, as a matter of fact, he was not going to attack Annie.18 
 This view is deeply problematic. Suppose Frowe is right, and theories of 
permissible defensive force based on objective conditions are useless because they 
require people to have information they lack. What, then, could be the use of an 
objectivist theory of liability? Many of the epistemic problems that impair our ability 
to know whether defensive force is permissible also impair our ability to know 
whether others are liable to such force. This is true both ex ante, when we are trying 
to figure out the moral status of those with whom we are dealing, and ex post, when 
we are trying to figure out, say, whether to blame or punish people who have 
defended themselves. If such uncertainty is sufficient to render objectivist theories 
of permissibility useless, it is also sufficient to render objectivist theories of liability 
useless. 
 Frowe insists on a hybrid theory, instead of a fully evidence-based view, 
because she thinks that letting go of an objective standard of liability goes too far. 
After all, such a view entails that our moral protections against defensive harm 
would not just depend on facts about ourselves, such as what we have done, the 
position in which we find ourselves, and so on, but (also) on facts about others, such 
                                                        
18 Frowe’s account aims to improve upon Kimberly Ferzan’s earlier account in Ferzan, 
“Justifying Self-Defense”. Ferzan was one of the first to draw attention to the problem of 
uncertainty in the context of liability to defensive harm. Ferzan correctly points out that a 
theory of liability that presupposes that defenders know things that they could never know 
(as most “objective” theories do) is useless or worse. However, Ferzan’s own account(s) 
insist(s) that epistemic considerations only come into play once an objective condition of 
culpability on part of the liable person is met. But of course the very same objection can be 
raised against this objective condition as Ferzan raises to objective theories more generally. 
For elaborations of this objection, see Frowe, “A Practical Account of Self-Defence”, and Jeff 
McMahan, “Self-Defense and Culpability”, Law and Philosophy 24 (2005): 751-774. 
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as their evidence, justified beliefs, and so on. That move, she thinks, is so 
uncomfortable as to be unacceptable.19 
 But a hybrid theory is no less uncomfortable. Even if our rights are not 
sensitive to others’ evidence, the permissibility of their using defensive harm is. So 
the hybrid theory does not prohibit any uses of force allowed by a more thoroughly 
evidence-based theory. As a result, these theories render us equally vulnerable to 
others’ using force. And surely the source of discomfort is the possibility of attack, 
not the mere absence of rights against attack. 
 In fact, and more importantly, combining an objectivist standard of liability 
with an evidence-based standard of permissibility runs the risk of incoherence. The 
correlativity of claim-rights and duties means that if Vince has a right that Annie not 
use force against him then Annie has a duty not to do so. To be non-liable to 
defensive force just is to have the right that others not expose one to such force. It 
follows that, other things equal, it is impermissible for Annie to use such force 
against Vince. 
 By separating these issues, Frowe’s theory denies the basic correlativity of 
rights and duties. And we cannot deny that idea without radically altering our 
                                                        
19 In fact, Frowe does not even think that we should base permissibility on evidence in 
general. The context of self-defense is special, she writes, because self-defense “is by its 
nature urgent: it does not allow for the deliberation or investigation that we ought to 
require in other parts of morality.” (Frowe, “A Practical Account of Self-Defence”, p. 257) If 
someone points a gun at you, you have to make a snap decision about whether or not it is 
permissible to kill her in self-defense. This, too, is unconvincing. Decisions about defense 
are hardly unique in being time-sensitive. And decisions about defensive harm can allow for 
extensive deliberation. A real-world example are preemptive and, especially, preventive 
wars. Given that there is no clear distinction between decisions about defensive force and 
other parts of life, the cost of postulating different sets of moral rules for these is 
considerable. For one, it would make it hard to see when rival (inconsistent) sets of moral 
rules apply, and thus what we ought to do. It would also make it hard to understand why 
one set of rules applies rather than another, or to what reasons our actions ought to be 
sensitive, and thus to solve uncertainty or disagreement about right action. 
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conception of rights in general, and accepting an idea of rights that lacks practical 
upshot or relevance. That is too high a price to pay for a theory of liability. 
 
4. Filling out the best bet 
The conclusion thus stands that the conditions under which people become liable 
include those where treating them as liable is part of our morally best bet. This 
section begins the task of filling out this account of liability as part of one’s best bet. 
What I will say does not exhaust the issue of liability or (a fortiori) the idea of a best 
bet, but identifies core cases where people are liable. 
 The account I offer departs from two important Lockean commitments. In 
the beginning of the Second Treatise Locke discusses the reasons why people can be 
justified in harming others, despite the fact that their rights normally protect them 
against this. Locke’s answer took the form of a forfeiture argument. Sometimes, 
people can lose (forfeit) those rights and thereby become liable to otherwise 
prohibited harms. Locke’s discussion offers two rationales for holding people to be 
liable in this way.20 One is that people become liable when they threaten the rights 
of others. The other is that people become liable when they decide to wrong others. 
 The first of these is based on the moral imperative to preserve life – or, as 
Locke put it, “the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind”.21 Part of the point of 
morality is to ensure that people can live together safely. This aim lies at the 
foundation of our rights – which are to offer us key protections against being 
wronged or harmed by others – as well as their limits – including forfeiture. The 
rationale for having rights in the first place thus also allows for their enforcement. It 
offers the protection that our rights were meant to provide all along. We can forfeit 
rights, therefore, when our presence poses a threat to the rights of others. 
                                                        
20 Perhaps I should say that I find these rationales in Locke’s discussion. I leave aside 
whether Locke would have endorsed these. My aim here is not Locke scholarship; it is an 
attempt at drawing insight from his text. 
21 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (1988 [1689]), Second Treatise, section. 7. 
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 The second rationale departs from the thought that decisions that would, if 
realized, foreseeably violate the rights of others can lower one’s own moral 
standing, and thereby lower the rights-protections that our standing would 
otherwise warrant.22 Let us call such decisions culpable decisions. We can become 
liable by making these culpable decisions because our status as rights-holders 
expresses, among other things, the fundamental moral equality of people. Rights 
offer protections against the unilateral imposition of ends by others. But this means 
that our moral status, and its accompanying protections, is importantly reciprocal. 
By demonstrating the lack of regard for others involved in culpably deciding to 
violate their rights, one undoes this reciprocity. Such culpable decisions 
demonstrate that one does not consider oneself bound by the moral law, and 
thereby forfeit one’s own rights-protection provided by that law.23 
 The two approaches to liability can come apart. It is possible for us to violate 
the rights without being culpable. If I bump into you because I am looking at my 
phone rather than where I am going, thereby knocking you off a cliff, I violate your 
rights. However, I would not be culpable in the manner described above, since I did 
                                                        
22 Acting in a rights-violating manner entails acting without moral justification. Violating a 
right is different from infringing a right. The latter are normally in conflict with the 
demands of other people’s rights, but are nevertheless done with moral justification. 
23 As Locke put it: “In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live 
by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set 
to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, 
the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. 
Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided 
for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve 
mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, 
and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him 
repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like 
mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH 
THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.” (II, 8) 
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not make a decision that foreseeably led to you falling down.24 Nevertheless, I would 
be liable to your defensive force. 
 It is also possible for people to culpably act in ways that would violate 
another’s rights without thereby succeeding. When the hitman takes aim, pulls the 
trigger, but his gun malfunctions, he is most definitely culpable for attempting to kill 
you. But it does not make sense to say that he violated your right to life. He took a 
decision that would, if realized, foreseeably violate your rights, but failed.25 
Nevertheless, in virtue of the second Lockean strand, the hitman is also liable to 
your defensive force. 
 Some might worry about the idea that people can become liable despite not 
actually posing a threat to others. However, it is not plausible that actual threats are 
necessary for liability.26 For one, this would make the targets of culpable decisions 
highly vulnerable. The hitman adopted all the motivational parts requisite for 
performing a grave rights-violation. He put himself in a position where, as soon as 
the option of killing his victim becomes available, he will engage in precisely the sort 
of rights-violation around which the idea of liability above is organized. It would 
thus be unreasonable to demand of the hitman’s target that she wait with initiating 
defensive force until the hitman got his weapon back in order. At that point, things 
may well be too late. 
 Moreover, such a view has perverse implications. Suppose that the target, 
upon seeing what the hitman is trying to do, chooses to defend herself. If actual 
threats are required for liability, it would follow that once the target takes out her 
own gun, aims at the hitman, and starts to pull the trigger, the target becomes liable. 
After all, she is posing a threat against the hitman who is not (on such an account) 
                                                        
24 Thus, should you survive and be injured I ought to pay you compensation for the rights-
violation. But it would not make sense for you to blame me for injuring you, as it was an 
accident. (It would make sense to blame me for my negligence.) 
25 He may, of course, still violate some other right of yours, such as the right not to expose 
you to the danger of being shot. 
26 As required, for example, by Quong’s theory. 
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liable. This is clearly unacceptable. Suppose the hitman were to quickly repair his 
gun and shoot the target before she has a chance to shoot him. In that case, accounts 
that require actual threats for liability entail that the hitman would not violate the 
target’s rights. After all, the target had become liable. This is bizarre. The hitman set 
out to kill his target in cold blood, yet it now turns out that killing her has become 
permissible.27 Indeed, calculating killers might exploit this possibility. Thus, the 
hitman might himself disable the gun, knowing that he might be able to fix it quickly 
enough to outdraw and kill his target. This is a license to kill for unscrupulous 
wrongdoers who are willing to take the chance of being outdrawn by their victims. 
 We need, then, to bring together both the culpability and rights-violation 
approaches above. On the account I propose: 
Y’s being liable to defensive force is part of X’s morally best bet if X is justified in 
believing either that Y is about to perform an objectively rights-violating act, or 
Y has culpably acted in a way that would, if successful, be such a rights-
violating act, or both. 
 A few things are worth noting. First, and obviously, the proposal renders Y’s 
liability sensitive to what X ‘s best bet in light of the evidence. Hence the role of X’s 
justified beliefs.28 However, because the account proposed here focuses only on 
what X is justified in believing about the dual sources of liability, we cannot simply 
                                                        
27 One might object that after the hitman repairs his gun, he is again a threat to the target 
and thereby again becomes liable. But this is mistaken. The hitman repaired his gun after 
his target became liable, and thus does not pose a threat to a non-liable person.  
28 The idea of being justified in believing something is complex. For present purposes, I will 
consider what X is justified in believing and X’s available evidence as more or less 
interchangeable. That is, I will consider X’s being justified in believing something in terms of 
X having sufficient evidence concerning that thing. However, this is ambiguous between the 
evidence that is in principle available to X and the evidence of which X has in fact availed 
himself. I think the correct account is organized around the latter for reasons outlined by 
Zimmerman in ch. 3 of Ignorance and Moral Obligation. But the account of liability does not 
turn on this, as it is a general concern about how to treat the evidence-relative dimension of 
morality. For this reason, I sideline these complicated issues. 
 
 20 
move from this judgment to the broader judgment that it is X’s best bet that the use 
of force is morally justified. What X is justified in believing about these conditions is 
only part of what goes into X’s correctly calculated best bet about what to do.29 
 Second, the dual condition above talks about Y performing an objectively 
rights-violating act. Y performs such an act if Y’s action would violate someone’s 
rights, and thus be something that Y (other things equal) ought not to do, were Y to 
have all the relevant evidence available. Part of the proposed dual account thus ties 
Y’s liability to X’s evidence about whether Y is to perform such an act. 
 This objectivist-sounding element prevents certain problems that would 
plague an even more thoroughly evidence-sensitive account. Consider a variation of 
an objection to such thoroughly evidence-sensitive accounts offered by Quong. 
Suppose a group of Duped Soldiers have been given convincing but false evidence 
that some neighboring group is about to attack them. If the soldiers set out to attack 
their neighbors in (mistaken) self-defense, and liability required that the soldiers do 
something that (other things equal) they ought not to do in light of their evidence, 
then the Duped Soldiers will be non-liable. This is problematic since the neighbors 
are clearly permitted (other things equal) to defend themselves against the Duped 
Soldiers.30 
 Quong is right that we should stay away from such a thoroughly evidence-
sensitive view. By focusing solely on the epistemic circumstances of agents, such a 
view loses sight of what ultimately matters: avoiding actual rights-violations. This is 
the reason the condition above refers to objective rights-violations. On that 
condition, the Duped Soldiers do become liable. By attacking their neighbors, they 
                                                        
29 I do not claim, for instance, that X’s best bet is also made up of X being justified in 
believing that force is necessary, proportionate, and so on. 
30 Quong discusses a slightly different case because he considers a slightly different 
evidence-based view from the one I have proposed here. Nevertheless, his discussion 
contains the basic building blocks of this (for my account more threatening) objection. See 
Quong, “Liability to Defensive Harm”, p. 62. 
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are about to do something that would violate the neighbors’ rights, were they to 
have all the evidence, and the neighbors know this.31 
 Third, the proposal entails that for Y to be liable to X, it must be true that X 
has evidence that the target of Y’s action is itself not liable to Y’s defensive force. 
This need not always be the case. If X is attacking Y, and X has evidence that Y has a 
right that X not attack Y, and X has evidence that Y is about to engage in permissible 
self-defense, then X will not be justified in believing that Y is about to violate X’s 
objective rights. For X’s evidence is that X is liable to Y’s use of defensive force, and 
therefore that Y is not about to violate X’s objective rights. 
 Finally, consider how this account of liability applies to cases like MISTAKEN 
ATTACKER. There, Annie (mistakenly) attacked Vince because of false but convincing 
evidence that Vince was about to commit an objective rights-violation. It follows, 
then, that Vince was liable to Annie. However, it also follows that Annie is liable to 
Vince’s use of force. For, despite her evidence, Vince does not satisfy the Lockean 
conditions, and Vince knows this. Thus, when Vince notices that Annie is about to 
attack him, his evidence suggests that Annie is about to engage in an objective 
rights-violation. As a result, Annie is liable to Vince’s self-defense. 
 Upon reflection, this strikes me as the correct verdict. Since it is true of 
neither Annie nor Vince that they ought not to attack the other, and since neither 
Annie nor Vince is in the relevant sense primarily responsible for the situation in 
which they find themselves, both Annie and Vince ought to be liable. MISTAKEN 
ATTACKER constitutes a tragedy in which each, through no fault of their own, 
becomes liable to the other’s use of force. 
 
5. Objections 
                                                        
31 The same is true, of course, for relevantly informed third parties. With respect to them, 
too, the Duped Soldiers are liable to defensive force. Note that, in these respects, the case of 
Duped Soldiers is equivalent to MISTAKEN ATTACKER. 
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In closing, I will discuss some objections to the account outlined above. I will first 
discuss two objections to the view’s evidence-sensitivity, then an objection to how 
the evidence-sensitive and rights-based parts fit together. 
 The most obvious worry about the account’s evidence-sensitivity is that it 
implies that if X has faulty evidence about Y, then Y can become liable to X even 
though Y is in fact innocent. I admit that this is both counter-intuitive and worrying. 
Indeed, I used to think it was clearly wrong myself. However, there are at least two 
reasons why, upon closer inspection, what may seem counter-intuitive or worrying 
is not so hard to swallow. The first and most important reason is the one we have 
already seen: the price of rejecting these implications is even higher. For the denial 
of this basic point requires the rejection of either the correlativity of rights and 
duties, or an unacceptable implication in UNCERTAIN RESCUE. 
 The second reason is that things are slightly better than they might seem. For 
even though the proposed theory allows that Y can become liable to X’s defensive 
force because of X’s faulty evidence, it also implies that if Z has better evidence, then 
Y is not only non-liable to Z but X is liable to Z as well. This means Z is permitted to 
intervene on Y’s behalf – as, of course, is Y himself. Consequently, if people are 
generally relatively likely to evaluate correctly the liability of others, the theory will 
in practice strongly tend toward the actual enforcement and preservation of rights. 
 Another objection holds that the theory I have proposed makes it too difficult 
for people to act wrongly, for example by violating the rights of others, even though 
they ought to be excused. The account above seems to imply that for people to 
violate the rights of others, they must act contrary to their evidence. And doing that 
seems simply inexcusable. But surely it is possible to do the wrong thing even 
though we should be excused. Thus, an evidence-based account is to be rejected.32 
 This is a mistake. There can be cases where people do not do what is, in light 
of the evidence, their best bet, and thus (other things equal) violate the rights of 
others, but should be excused. For it can be reasonable, or at least understandable, 
to believe things that we are not justified in believing. One example is when we act 
                                                        
32 For a variation of this objection, see Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense”, pp. 713 and 729. 
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on the basis of beliefs that result from certain standard cognitive biases. When we 
suffer from biases in ways that we are not culpable for failing to correct, we can 
believe that we are acting permissibly in ways that ought to be excused. Since the 
account above refers to our justified beliefs, it does not preclude acting wrongly in 
ways that ought to be excused. 
 A third and final worry concerns the compatibility of the proposed theory’s 
rights-based and evidence-sensitive parts. Most worryingly, perhaps, the account 
allows people to gain or retain rights that, in objectivist terms, they should lose. 
Indeed, it allows for this to happen as a result of their wrongdoing. All that is 
required is for the evidence to line up in the requisite way. This opens up worrying 
possibilities of manipulation. Suppose that an evil group is in the process of killing 
many innocent people. And suppose that they try to hide the evidence of their 
heinous deeds, say by threatening to kill the families of anyone who would report 
their killings. If the evil group were successful, it would follow that the group is not 
liable to defensive force. 
 For a theory organized around the moral importance of rights, this looks like 
a problem. Indeed, it is especially a problem for the theory defended here, since it 
bases liability in part around Lockean motivations. Rights-holders, I said, enjoy a 
kind of moral status or standing, and so this theory of liability implies that people 
can acquire moral standing through wrongdoing. The evil group, after all, manages 
to retain its right against defensive force through unjustly threatening others. This is 
the exact opposite of the moral reciprocity discussed above. 
 Obviously, this is a worrying result. But in the end I do not think it poses a 
problem for the theory of liability defended here. For it is in general a possibility 
that people acquire rights despite and through their wrongdoing. Suppose that 
Beth’s will states that, were she to die, Chuck inherits all her money. And suppose 
Chuck murders Beth. Chuck would thereby gain a right to Beth’s money through his 
wrongdoing. Chuck would thus acquire the standing of a right-holder through his 
own wrongdoing. This worrying possibility has to be allowed in general, it seems. As 
a result, its existence does not constitute an objection to the theory I have outlined. 
 
 24 
Unfortunately, morality sometimes allows the especially heinous to manipulate 
their standing. 
